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ABSTRACT. Scholars are divided over whether a victims rights persist
when an agent permissibly responds to an emergency. According to the
prevailing view the moral force of rights is not extinguished by moral per-
missibility and the agent, therefore, has a duty to compensate the victim.
According to another influential view permissibility does erase the moral
force of rights and the agent, therefore, can only have a duty to compensate
for reasons other than the fact that they committed a rights transgression.
I argue that liability does not follow even if we grant that the victims rights
persevere. A non-pecuniary remedy such as a formal apology provides an
adequate way of vindicating the victims rights and of recognizing the
agents causal role. Thus, the answer to the question of what remedy the
permissible transgressor owes the victim does not provide us with an answer
to the question of who should bear the burden.
Consider those cases in which an individual damages the
property of another so as to escape a deadly predicament – the
hiker who breaks into a cabin in order to escape from an
unexpected and life threatening blizzard, or the ship captain
who jettisons cargo during an unexpected and violent storm in
order to prevent the ship from sinking, or the diabetic who
takes some of her absent friends insulin in order to avoid
lapsing into a coma. While rare in practice an individuals
responses to circumstances of peril are often thought to throw
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into sharp relief a number of key issues in moral and legal
philosophy. These include the extent to which rights are a
constraint on action, whether a permissible act can also entail a
wrong, whether an individual can be blamed for a permissible
act, the extent to which the force of rights is dissipated when
they are permissibly transgressed. In this article I examine those
questions insofar as they are germane to the further question of
who should bear those burdens that emerge as the result of
permissible harm doing.
Few philosophers would deny that the imperiled hiker, ship
captain or diabetic is permitted to act in the way they did. In
effect we accept that a right is not a constraint on action when
the reasons for permitting self-rescue sufficiently outweigh the
reasons for protecting the right. What philosophers do dis-
agree over is whether the burdens that are the product of
permissible behavior should be borne by the harmdoer (lia-
bility), the rightholder (losses left to lie where they fall) or
everyone (members of a private or social insurance pool). For
many scholars the answer to that question hinges on the ex-
tent to which permissibility extinguishes the moral force of
rights.
What I take to be the received view contends that while the
imperiled agent did not violate a right, it remains the case that
she infringed a right.1 The presence of competing demands
means she is permitted not to discharge her duty not to trans-
gress. For the same reasons the rightholder is not permitted to
1 See, in particular, Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the
Inalienable Right to Life, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7(2) (1978): 93–123 at
pp. 101–102; Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘‘Self Defense and Rights’’, ‘‘Rights
and Compensation’’, ‘‘Some Ruminations on Rights’’, and ‘‘Remarks on
Causation and Liability’’, collected in her Rights, Restitution and Risk
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) and Judith Jarvis
Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1991), pp. 98–103. See also Nancy Davis, Rights, Permission, and
Compensation, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14(4) (1985): 374–384; Peter
Westen, Comment on Montagues Rights and Duties of Compensation,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 14(4) 1985: 385–389, David McCarthy, Rights,
Explanations, and Risks, Ethics 107(2) (1997): 205–225 at pp. 208–210 and
Andrew Botterell, In Defence of Infringement, Law and Philosophy 27(3)
2008: 269–292.
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prevent the agent from rescuing herself. Even so it remains the
case that the stricken agent failed to fulfill a duty and, therefore,
that she infringed the correlative claim of the rightholder that
she not transgress. In other words, the fact that she acted per-
missibly does not amount to saying that she did not act in a way
that she ought not. Thus, the moral force of the right is not
entirely obliterated by the permissibility of her actions. The
received view further contends that the residual force that is
retained by the infringed right is sufficient to establish the
imperiled agents duty to compensate the rightholder for the
destructive costs her actions produced.2 This stands in contrast
with a rights violation (i.e. impermissible transgression), say the
hiker vandalized the cabin, because in that case her duty to
compensate cannot be discharged by another and she is, in
addition, eligible for some form of punitive treatment.
Against the received view it has been argued that rights
disappear without a moral trace in those cases when the actions
of the agent are permissible.3 That conclusion may be arrived at
either by specifying that the right simply ceases to exist in such
cases or that the there is a prima facie right that is entirely
overridden in such cases. According to the erasure view
permissibility entails that the victim does not possess a claim-
right against the agent, and so the agent has no duty not to
2 The classic legal case on this issue is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. Sup. Ct., 1910). In keeping with received view the
court found that the defendant acted properly when he did not untie his ship
from the plaintiffs dock in order to prevent it from sinking during a violent
storm, but ordered him to pay compensation to the plaintiff for the damage
that was subsequently caused to the dock. The court also referred to a
decision reached two years earlier by the Supreme Court of Vermont in
Ploof vs. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. Sup. Ct., 1908). In that case the court found
that the defendant was vicariously liable for losses caused as a result of his
employee unmooring the plaintiffs boat from the defendants dock during a
violent storm.
3 See, for example, Philip Montague, Rights and Duties of Compensa-
tion, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13(1) (1984): 79–88, Russ Shafer-Landau,
Specifying Absolute Rights, Arizona Law Review, 37 (1995): 209–225 and
John Oberdiek, Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Dis-
tinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights, Law and Philosophy 23(4)
(2004): 325–346.
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transgress. Thus, rights only trigger a duty to compensate in
those cases where the agent acted impermissibly (i.e. committed
a rights violation). It follows from this that a permissible harm
doer can only be required to compensate the victim for reasons
other than the fact that she transgressed a right.
The position I defend accepts the received views claim that
infringed rights leave a moral trace, but rejects its further claim
that the agent has a duty to compensate the rightholder. I argue
that liability is unnecessary because the fulfillment of a duty to
apologize or express regret is sufficient to accommodate the
residual moral force of infringed rights. In support of that claim
I argue that the infringer is not liable because she was not
presented with an adequate opportunity to avoid the harmful
outcome (argument from avoidability) and because the cir-
cumstances of peril arose as a result of the agency of innu-
merable individuals (argument from joint causation). The latter
argument also lends support to the claim that the rightholders
losses should be held in common.
I contend that these arguments succeed even if we accept the
core components of the received views argument for the lia-
bility of permissible harm-doers – namely that, (i) causation is a
necessary condition for the duty to compensate, (ii) rights that
have been permissibly transgressed retain moral force, and (iii)
an evaluation of the transgressors reasons for action has no
bearing on whether she acted permissibly or has a duty to
compensate. This approach differs from the existing responses
to the received view in the literature because it does not aim to
question one or more of that views basic premises. I contend
that while those three premises provide us with sufficient reason
to impose a remedial obligation on the permissible harm doer,
they do not provide sufficient reason for insisting that the
remedy must be compensatory. The duty to apologize or
express regret provides an adequate means for vindicating the
victims rights and for recognizing the causal role of the agent.
If that line of argument stands up to scrutiny then the answer to
the question of what the permissible harm doer owes the victim
does not provide us with an answer to the question of who
should bear the burden.
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The article is divided into two principal parts. In Sections
I–III, I unpack the basic premises that underpin the received view
and demonstrate how those premises are consistent with the non-
liability of the permissible harm doer. Sections IV–VII, I present
the case against assigning losses due to permissible actions to the
agent or victim and for holding such losses in common.
I. CAUSATION
According to the received view the fact that As permissible
actions caused V to suffer a loss provides us with at least prima
facie reason for As duty to compensate V. Equally, As causal
role provides at least prima facie reason not to shift the loss to
those individuals who did not causally contribute to the crea-
tion of the loss, such as V or members of an insurance pool.
Moreover, that remains the case irrespective of luck in the way
things turn out: Thus if, in order to escape a violent storm, A
and B tie their identical boats in a likewise fashion to Vs dock
without his permission and yet only As boat damages the dock,
then only A can have a duty to compensate V.
Evidence for the significance of causation is provided by
what Bernard Williams termed agent-regret – the feeling on
the part of the agent who caused the harmful outcome that it
would have been better if she had done otherwise.4 According
to Williams the agents sense of regret remains even in those
cases where she was not at fault for causing the harm. Thus,
she may still feel regret even though she took extraordinary
precautions or her actions were permissible given the circum-
stances. In addition, agent-regret represents a qualitatively
different form of regret than that which may be experienced by
a spectator who was not causally involved – boat owner B in
the above example may feel regret simply because V incurred a
loss, while boat owner A may feel regret because her albeit
permissible actions caused Vs loss. Williams goes as far as to
argue that the phenomenon of agent-regret reflects the fact that
4 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers
1973–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20–39 at
pp. 27–31 and Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993), pp. 132–137.
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the consequences of a persons faulty or faultless actions are
constitutive their identity as an agent.5 Williams further notes
that agent-regret involves the expression of regret in various
ways, rather than merely being in a state of mind where one
feels regret. Thus, a particular agent may think that it is nec-
essary to express her sentiment of regret by compensating the
victim or by apologizing. However, the fact that agent-regret
arises because of a first-person assessment means that it falls
short of establishing that the harm doer should be saddled with
a remedial obligation of any description, let alone a duty to
compensate the victim. For a particular harm doer may con-
clude that no expressive response is required or that an apology
or voicing of regret suffices. Nor is it necessary that the agent
express their regret in order to preserve their identity as an
agent. Thus, further argumentation on behalf of the received
view is required in order to establish the claim that the agent is
required to absorb the loss that she has caused.
Twomain lines of argument have been proposed in support of
the claim that those who cause a loss have a duty to compensate
the victim. According to the first line of argument the agent owns
herself, her powers, and, therefore, the losses (or benefits) that
flow from the exercise of those powers. Hence, the agent should
take back the costs that her actions impose on others by com-
pensating the victim.6 According to the second line of argument
the agent is liable because she pursued her own ends at the
expense of the victims opportunity to pursue his ends. The vic-
tims freedom of action is constrained either because he is denied
what enables him to pursue his ends or because he must devote
resources that he would spend pursuing alternative ends to
5 Williams, Moral Luck, p. 29. Tony Honorés account of outcome-
responsibility also appeals to the idea that good and bad consequences of a
persons actions are constitutive of their sense of themselves as an agent. See
his Responsibility and Fault, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 27–32, 76–
78.
6 For a thoroughgoing analysis of the libertarian account of liability see
Stephen R. Perry, Libertarianism, Entitlement and Responsibility, Philos-
ophy & Public Affairs 26(4) (1997): 351–396 at 369–373, 375–376.
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repairing or replacing what has been damaged or consumed.7
Thus, the agent is liable because she unfairly caused the outcome,
and not simply because she causally contributed to its emergence.
For the sake of clarity I simply assume that the received views
justification of the causality condition combines both of these
strands of argument. Thus, the agent owns the loss in those cases
where she pursues her ends at the expense of the victims
opportunity to pursue his ends.
I take it that in order to avoid indeterminacy the causality
condition also requires a foreseeability standard. Because the
harmful outcome was the product of innumerable causal
antecedents (including actions taken by the rightholder, e.g.,
the cabin owners loss would not have occurred if he had built
the cabin somewhere else or not at all), causality by itself is
unable to isolate a particular agent as the unique cause. Thus, a
standard of foreseeability is required in order to pinpoint which
agent unfairly externalized the costs of their activities.8 In cases
such as necessity it might appear that foreseeability does not
affect the received views position because the agent who is
subject to an emergency can reasonably foresee the outcome
that her actions might cause. However, as I argue in Section V,
if we apply the foreseeability standard to the emergence of the
circumstances of peril, rather than the emergence of the loss
7 See David McCarthy, Harming and Allowing Harm, Ethics 110(4)
(2000): 749–779 at pp. 756–757, 762, 774 and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
Critical Study on Jonathan Bennetts The Act Itself, Noûs 30(4) (1996):
545–557 at p. 555 and Thomson (1986, pp. 199–202).
8 On the need for foreseeability in order to overcome indeterminacy see
Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,
in G. Postema (ed.) Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), pp. 72–130 at pp. 91–93. Note, however, the pro-
ponents of received view typically assume that foreseeability affects the
agents eligibility for civil liability, but not whether she acted in a way that she
ought not. Indeed that stance accords with the idea that unforeseeability does
not eliminate agent-regret. See Thomson, 1991, pp. 232–233, 240. Thus, the
reason why unforeseeability renders an agent ineligible for civil liability is not
that it diminishes the extent of her wrongdoing. A further upshot of this is
that a foreseeability standard does not specify the parameters of the victims
right. The agent transgresses the victims claim-right that she not u even if she
cannot reasonably foresee that her actions will cause u.
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itself, then it does not follow that the imperiled agent is liable.
There is also the sticky question of whether the imperiled agent
can avoid the outcome even though she can foresee it. I take up
the question of avoidability in Section III.
II. MORAL RESIDUALISM
According to advocates of the erasure view the causality con-
dition cannot establish liability because permissibility entails
that the victim did not possess a claim-right that the agent not
cause the loss. With that challenge in mind I now turn to
examine the received views contention that permissibility does
not extinguish the moral force of rights.
The received view rests on the claim that at least part of the
moral force of rights does not derive from more basic consider-
ations.9 According to the erasure view, by contrast, the moral
status of rights is entirely derivative. That is to say, rights do not
provide an independent basis for moral assessment. While the
received view assumes that a right is one of the moral consider-
ations that enter into our deliberations over whether an action is
permissible (i.e. permissibility is in part dependent on the
intrinsic value of rights),10 the erasure view contends that the
existence of a right is dependent on the outcome of those delib-
erations.11 Thus, the latter contends that an individual only has a
right if the conclusion of our examination of the moral argu-
ments for and against action is that the agent is not permitted to
act. In other words, a right does not exist when the underlying
moral reasons for the right (e.g. protection of the victims basic
9 For one account of the intrinsic value of rights see F. M. Kamm,
Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities and Permissible Harm (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 28–29, 253–256, 269–271.
10 See Thomson, 1986, pp. 37, 39.
11 The claim that rights are the conclusions, rather than the premises, of
moral argument is perhaps most clearly exampled by the specificationist
account of rights. See, for example, John Oberdiek, Specifying Rights Out
of Necessity, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28(1) 2008: 127–146. The
prima facie account does presuppose a right, but only as a provisional
summary of underlying reasons for the right. Thus, whether in the final
analysis an individual has an actual right is dependent on an examination of
all the relevant underlying moral considerations.
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interest in being able to choose and pursue his or her ends) are
outweighed by countervailing considerations (e.g. the imperiled
agents basic interest in avoiding a premature demise). What this
alsomeans is that if there is amoral residue in permissibility cases
it is not because of the intrinsic value of rights. John Oberdiek,
for example, argues that a moral residue emerges because of the
inevitable loss of value that arises when incompatible moral
reasons are in competition.12 The presence of a moral residue,
thus understood, does not presuppose the persistence of a right.
For the purposes of this article I simply assume that there are
non-derivative reasons for the persistence of rights during times
of emergency. However, it is worth noting that accepting the
derivative account of rights does not commit us to the view that
rights are erased by permissibility. To see this notice how the
notion of a rights infringement reflects the fact that permissibility
does not amount to saying that the agents actions were justified
or rightful - the reasons against acting remain in place even
though they are outweighed (Equally, the notion of a rights
violation reflects that fact that the reasons against actingwere not
outweighed). Thus, recognizing that an infringement occurred is
in keeping with the moral residue generated by the conflict be-
tween underlying practical reasons. If that is correct then the
claim that the victims rights persist during times of emergency is
not at odds with background morality. To the contrary, it serves
to capture the normative complexity entailed by moral permis-
sibility. In other words, I take it that we are not necessarily
committed to the erasure view even if we reject the claim that
rights provide a non-derivative basis for moral assessment.
But how exactly might the received view accommodate the
idea that the imperiled agent is allowed to act even though they
act as they ought not by doing so? In Hohfeldian terms the
received view rests on the contention that the imperiled agents
liberty-right does not entail the absence of the victims claim-
right. V has a claim-right against A that she not u, which is
correlated with As duty not to u. At the same time A possesses
12 See Oberdiek, 2004, pp. 332–333, John Oberdiek, Whats Wrong with
Infringements (Insofar as Infringements are Not Wrong): A Reply, Law and
Philosophy 27(3) 2008: 293–307 at pp. 305–308 and Russ Shafer-Landau,
1995, p. 215.
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a liberty against V to u, which means that A has no duty to V
not to u. Moreover, A has a liberty-right against V in virtue of
the fact that As liberty is protected by her claim that V not
prevent her from u-ing.13 According to some advocates of the
received view a rights-conflict does not pertain between Vs
claim-right and As liberty-right. They contend that V has a
civil claim-right that A not u, but not a criminal claim-right
that A not u. Equally, A has a criminal liberty-right to u, but
not a civil liberty-right to u.14 Thus, by acting permissibly A
commits a civil infringement, but not a criminal violation of Vs
right. This, I take it, provides one way of capturing the moral
complexity entailed by permissibility.15
13 Proponents of the erasure viewmay argue that because of the fact that V
has a duty not to prevent A fromu-ing, he does not retain a right of exclusion.
Hence, or so the argument goes, Bs liberty-right to u entails that V does not
retain a claim-right thatAnotu. The received views response to this challenge
is to argue that Vs duty is not a consequence of the fact that A is permitted to
u. Rather, it is because he (or a bystander) may not act in way that is in itself
impermissible (e.g. blocking a person from using the means she has available
to escape a deadly predicament) in order to prevent a transgression taking
place (i.e. it is because of the fact that preventing u is wrong per se that As
liberty to u acquires the status of a right). According to the received view,
therefore,V is not permitted to apply the right she has to excludeA fromu-ing.
See Thomson, 1986, pp. 69–70 and Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 301, 371–372.
14 See Westen, 1985, Thomson, 1991, p. 103 and Botterell, 2008, pp. 276–
278.
15 In an interesting departure from both the received and erasure views
Arthur Ripstein adopts a Kantian position whereby there remains an
absolute constraint against transgression in cases of peril. Thus, the actions
of the imperiled agent are impermissible (i.e. the imperiled agent has no
criminal or civil liberty-right to transgress). However, punitive treatment
would be pointless because it would not (prospectively) affect her conduct.
That is to say, the threat of (proportionate) punishment is pointless because
it will not serve to protect the victims rights. By contrast the law can compel
her to make good the loss generated by the rights violation (i.e. damages for
trespass). See his In Extremis, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2(2)
(2005): 415–434 at pp. 423, 425. Thus, Ripstein arrives at the same con-
clusion as the received view but based on the claim that acts of necessity
entail an (unpunishable) rights violation. Nevertheless, I take it that the
arguments I present in the following sections count equally against Rip-
steins position and the received view.
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Thus far I have presented what I take to be the strongest case
for the liability of the imperiled agent. Namely, an agent has a
duty to compensate for losses that she has permissibly inflicted
because she has both (i) infringed a right that the victim has and
(ii) externalized the costs of her actions. As we have seen
advocates of the erasure view reject (i) and, therefore, the claim
that the duty to compensate (if there is one) follows from the
fact that the agent has transgressed a right. By contrast I
contend that a duty to compensate is not required in order to
accommodate (i). Rather the duty to apologize or express regret
is sufficient to accommodate the residual force of rights that
have been permissibly transgressed (i.e. sufficient acknowl-
edgement of the fact that the agent has not fulfilled a duty that
she owed the rightholder). If that is correct then the requisite
remedial obligation does not provide us with an answer to the
question of who should bear the burden.
In response it may be argued that the duty to compensate can
be arrived at without appealing to the claim that the imperiled
agent infringed a right. Rather it may be based on the victims
claim that the imperiled agent not u without compensating him
for the resulting loss. It follows that the agent has a liberty-right
to u in virtue of the awaited remedy, rather than simply in virtue
of the circumstances of peril. Thus, compensation serves to ren-
der the agents actions permissible, rather than to rectify a wrong
that was committed by the agent.16 According to this approach
instances of private necessity should be seen as analogous with
the states power of eminent domain – e.g. firefighters are per-
mitted to nonconsensually cut down a section of privately owned
forest to prevent the spread of a deadly forest fire, provided the
state subsequently reimburses the property owner.
The claim-right being elucidated here takes the following con-
ditional form –Vhas a claim thatAnotu unless p1…px, where the
latter comprises the sufficient conditions for Vs claim not to hold.
According to the conditioning approach those same conditions
also comprise the sufficient conditions forAs liberty-right tou (i.e.
16 See, for example, Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, Havard Law Review 72(3) (1959): 401–444 and Howard Klepper,
Torts of Necessity: A Moral Theory of Compensation, Law and Philosophy
9(3) (1990): 223–239.
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Ahas a liberty-right tou, if p1…px). Those conditionsmay include
one ormore of the following: V consents to Bu-ing,A is subject to
circumstances of peril, V incurs no loss as result of A u-ing,
A compensates V for the losses V incurred as a result of A u-ing.
The view under scrutiny accepts that if ex ante consent cannot
be acquired (e.g. seeking the rightholders permission would
preclude the possibility of the agents self-rescue), then it may be
substituted for by a combination of the presence of peril and ex
post compensation (or presence of peril and absence of a loss).17
Thus, if A inflicts a loss onVas a result of her attempts to escape a
deadly predicament and subsequently refuses to compensate V,
then she violates Vs claim-right – not because of her failure to
compensate per se, but rather because she impermissibly trans-
gressed Vs conditional claim-right. However, if both the requi-
site conditions are fulfilled, then A does not transgress Vs right.
Equally if V does not incur a loss as a result of As self-rescue (i.e.
there is no destructive costs and V is not denied the opportunity
to use the property or rent it out), then no transgression took
place. This stands in contrast with the received view which insists
that A can only avoid transgressing Vs claim-right if she obtains
Vs prior consent. When A acts nonconsensually the presence or
absence of peril merely serves to determine whether the trans-
gression constituted an infringement or a violation. Even if V
incurred no loss as a result of As nonconsensual self-rescue it
remains the case that A denied Vs right of control over how his
right is used. Thus, the received view contends that compensation
serves to correct rather than to avert a transgression.
I take it that the conditioning approach may be seen as a
variation of the erasure or received view. According to the first
17 This conditioning approach is in keeping the distinction between prop-
erty rules and liability rules that is employed by exponents of the economic
analysis of law. See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Har-
vardLawReview 85(6) (1972): 1089–1128.According to the former type of rule
the agent is legitimately entitled to u only if the rightholder consents to the
transfer. According to the latter, the agents compensation of the rightholder
for the value ofu is sufficient to legitimate the agents entitlement tou. In those
cases where the agent is subject to peril the protection afforded to property is
relegated from property rules to liability rules.
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interpretation Vs claim-right that A not u, is erased if A is
subject to peril and compensates V after the fact. It other
words, A can only avoid committing a rights violation if both
conditions are satisfied.18 According to the second interpreta-
tion, the absence of consent means that Vs claim-right is not
entirely erased by the fulfillment of those two conditions and
yet they are both necessary conditions for As liberty right to u.
In other words, it is only if both conditions are satisfied that As
transgression constitutes an infringement as opposed to a vio-
lation of Vs claim-right. The conditioning approach, therefore,
does not necessarily entail a rejection of moral residualism.
As I see it the problem with the conditioning approach is
that it begs two questions: (i) Why is exposure to peril not a
sufficient condition? And, (ii) if imperilment is not sufficient,
why is compensation as opposed to some other response by the
agent (e.g. formal apology) the further condition that is
required? By way of illustration, consider the case of a mistaken
payment that is innocently received. Although the recipient
infringed no right in receiving the payment, she is required to
return it in virtue of the fact that she does not have a right to it.
By contrast, the hiker who breaks into a cabin so as to escape a
life-threatening blizzard has a right to consume the cabin
owners food and burn his furniture insofar as it is necessary
escape the deadly predicament. Her liberty-right in virtue of
peril means that she did not cause a loss beyond what she had a
right to and so it is not clear why compensation should be
included as further condition of that right. If, however, the
imperiled hiker accidentally consumes more food than is nec-
essary to survive, then she may be required to pay the owner the
value of that excess for the same reasons as the recipient of a
mistaken payment is required to return it to its rightful own-
er.19 What this suggests is that even if the imminent threat of
peril is not a sufficient condition for the agents liberty-right we
18 See Shafer-Landau, 1995, p. 216 and William A, Parent and William J.
Prior, Thomson on the Moral Specification of Rights, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research LVI(4) (1996): 837–845 at pp. 840–843.
19 A similar line of argument is developed by Dennis Klimchuk in his
Necessity and Restitution, Legal Theory 7(1) (2001): 59–81 at pp. 69–71.
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may ask why making good the victims loss, as opposed to say
apologizing, must comprise the further condition.
Indeed there is, I contend, good reason to saddle the
imperiled agent with a duty to apologize rather than a duty to
compensate – whether as a further condition that is built into
the victims claim-right or, as a subsidiary duty following from
the fact that the agent infringed the victims claim-right.
Compare the case of the hiker who breaks into a cabin to avoid
death by exposure with the case of the hiker who burns down
part of a cabin as a result of failing to adequately extinguish a
campfire. The problem with the received view and the condi-
tioning approach is that they prescribe a duty to compensate in
both cases even though the gravity of the wrong committed by
the negligent hiker is clearly greater. My approach allows us to
differentiate between these two instances of civil wrongdoing
because the imperiled agent is only saddled with a duty to
apologize or express regret.
III. FIRST-ORDER MORALITY
I now turn to clarify the third basic premise of the received
view; namely, the irrelevance of the effect of peril on the agents
will. According to the received view it is important to distin-
guish between three types of question: Is A allowed to u? Who
should bear the burden that results from A having u-ed? Is A
eligible for moral criticism for u-ing? Only the latter question
requires that we take into account the content and attributa-
bility of the agents reasons for action. In other words, what the
agent was thinking when she acted (second-order morality) has
no bearing on the permissibility of her actions or whether she
must bear the burden (first-order morality).20 Thus, the
received view contends that the effect of the emergency on the
agents reasons for action only becomes relevant when we turn
20 The distinction between these two orders of morality was originally
drawn by Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 1977), p. 55 and subsequently further developed by Jonathan
Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 46–49. Here I
extend Donagan and Bennetts account by including the assignment of
burdens within the scope of first-order morality.
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to consider whether it would be appropriate to praise or blame
the agent for what she has done. What this means is that the
agent who responds to an emergency may attract noncriminal
liability even though her actions were permissible and blame-
less, perhaps even praiseworthy – say, because we admire her
quick thinking under adversity or because she infringed in
order to rescue another from peril.
Let us firstly consider the application of first-ordermorality to
the question of whether the agent was allowed to act as they did.
According to proponents of the received view the permissibility
of an action does not depend on whether the harmful outcome
was intended or ill-intended.21 All that is required for permissi-
bility is that the agent acted in a way that was consistent with a
predefined standard of conduct (e.g. an agent is permitted to
transgress when it is necessary to avoid a greater evil of sufficient
magnitude). In other words, we need not examine the trans-
gressors reasons for action in order to determine whether she has
committed an infringement or a violation. Thus, the fact that
hiker intends to damage the cabin in order to escape a blizzard
does not mean that her actions are less permissible than the boat
owner who does not intend to damage the dock when she seeks
safe harbor during a violent storm. Equally, the reasons why the
permissible harm doer acted have no bearing on whether the
victims right perseveres. Thus, it remains the case that the boat
owner failed to fulfill a duty that she owed the dock owner even
though she did not intend to cause any damage to the dock.22
21 See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson Self-Defense, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 20(4) (1991): 283–310, Section V; and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Two Arguments, Ethics 109(3) (1999): 497–518. David McCarthy,
Intending Harm, Foreseeing Harm, and Failures of the Will, Noûs 36(4)
(2002): 622–642. Nancy Davis, The Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of
Interpretation, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1984): 107–123.
22 According to the received view permissibility is also unaffected by
whether the agent could objectively or subjectively foresee the harmful
outcome. The fact that we could not reasonable expect the agent to foresee
the outcome is a first-order consideration that speaks to the question of who
should bear the burden, but not to the question of whether the agent acted
as she ought not. By contrast, the fact that the agent did not actually foresee
the outcome is a second-order consideration which has no bearing on either
question.
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Permissibility is also unaffected by whether an agent trans-
gresses because of the reasonable but mistaken belief that she is
subject to peril (e.g. A falsely assumes that B is threatening her
life). In such cases advocates of the received view maintain that
the agents transgression is impermissible and that the right-
holder may, therefore, exercise his right to exclude.23 As a
second-order matter, however, she may be praised (e.g. for
rescuing a person she mistakenly believes to be imperiled) and
excused of committing the rights violation if her mistake is
deemed to have been reasonable. Nevertheless, she remains
eligible for noncriminal liability.
Let us now turn to consider the application of first-order
morality to the question of who should bear the burden. As we
have already observed the received view is committed to the
claim that moral permissibility does not entail a complete legal
justification – while the stricken agents actions may have been
criminally justified (i.e. did not contravene a criminal duty not
to u), it remains the case that her actions were civilly unjustified
(i.e. contravened a civil duty not to u). This stands in contrast
with the erasure view which contends that moral permissibility
does entail a complete legal justification (i.e. the imperiled agent
committed neither a criminal nor a civil transgression).
According to the received view, therefore, the imperiled agent
has duty to compensate because her actions entail that she
committed a noncriminal wrong against the rightholder and
caused a loss to the rightholder.
In response to this it may be argued that the effect of the
emergency on the agents reasons for action means that she is
not sufficiently responsible for committing the civil wrongdoing
and, therefore, she should not be saddled with a duty to com-
23 Taking the opposing view Kent Greenwalt has argued that the rea-
sonable but mistaken belief that justifying conditions pertain, qualifies as a
justification. See his The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse,
Columbia Law Review 84(8) (1984): 1897–1927 at pp. 1919–1920. However,
as Alan Brudner notes, Greenwalt assumes that an assessment of the agents
reasons for acting in response to the (mistaken) emergency is relevant to the
question of whether those actions were justified. Alan Brudner, A Theory of
Necessity, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7(3) (1987): 339–368 at pp. 364–
365.
SIMON WIGLEY632
pensate the rightholder. George Fletcher, for example, has ar-
gued the case for the relevance of excusing conditions to non-
criminal liability.24 In cases of peril I take it that although the
agent is presented with options, she finds herself unable resist
one of them. Thus, while the hiker who is exposed to a life
threatening blizzard does in fact have the option not to break
into the cabin, she is unable to withstand her desire to avoid the
consequences of not doing so.25 Of course, she could have been
moved to act by reasons other than the desire to protect life and
limb, but it would overstrain human nature to expect her to be
able to do so.26 Even an orthodox stoic, who is convinced that
for the sake of her inner well-being she should die rather steal
or damage another persons property, may not be able to resist
the desire to preserve herself. The orthodox stoic could theo-
retically have been moved to act by reasons other than the
desire to preserve herself, but it would be asking too much to
expect that even she would be able to resist the urge to do so.
This suggests that the imperiled agent did the best that we can
expect of a person of reasonable fortitude and, therefore, that
she is should not be held responsible for committing the wrong.
It follows, or so the argument goes, that she should not bear the
burden created by her wrongdoing.
24 George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, Harvard Law
Review 85(3) (1972): 537–573 at pp. 551–553.
25 In addition it may be argued that the imperiled agent is not responsible
for her actions if the fact that she fears for her life means that she cannot
think straight. In that case the agents reasons for action are not attributable
because her judgment is impaired, rather than because of the irresistibility of
the desire to self-preserve. On impairment as an excuse when the agent is
subject to an irresistible desire see Gary Watson, Excusing Addiction, in
Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), pp. 318–350 at pp. 337–338.
26 Here I differ from Harry Frankfurt who implies that the imperiled
agent does not have an alternative because it is impossible for her to resist
the desire to self-preserve. See Harry G. Frankfurt Coercion and Moral
Responsibility, in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 26–46 at pp. 42–46. See also his
Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, pp. 1–10 at pp. 2–4 in
the same volume.
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As we have already observed the received view responds to
this challenge by arguing that the effect of peril on the agents
will speaks to the question of blameworthiness and not to the
distinct question of who should bear the cost. Thus, that view
holds that the imperiled agent must bear the burden irrespective
of her eligibility for moral criticism. The effect of peril on the
content (i.e. not moved to act by a malign motive) and attrib-
utability (i.e. desire to avoid a premature demise is virtually
irresistible) of her reasons for action simply has bearing on
whether she should take back the cost she has caused.
My primary aim in this section has been to elucidate the third
central plank of the received views argument for the liability of
permissible harm doers. With that in mind I will shortly present
two arguments against liability for permissible transgressions
that follow even if we accept the irrelevance of second-order
morality. Nevertheless, we may ask why we should insist that
those factors that count against blaming the imperiled agent for
committing the infringement should not also count against her
civil liability. I take it that central concern of the received view is
that if excusing conditions are deemed to be pertinent, then too
much emphasis would be placed on the doer to the detriment of
the sufferer.27 As a result the doer and sufferer are not treated
equally – the sufferer is treated as a means to the doers ends.
The assumption being made here is that taking back the burden
created by ones actions is required in order to restore equality
between the parties. But that assumption does not countenance
the possibility that an apology or expression of regret is suffi-
cient to vindicate the sufferers rights. Moreover, that require-
ment may provide a fitting way to express any residual blame
that we might attach to the imperiled agents actions. Because it
27 Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2002), pp. 49–51, 106–107 and Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 54. A related
concern is that first person moral evaluation would expose the victim to the
peculiarities of the agent (e.g. the circumstances of necessity may be created
by an agents unusual phobia). This problem can be overcome by intro-
ducing an ordinary person standard for excusing conditions. Notice, how-
ever, that this represents an argument against individualizing excusing
conditions and not against the relevance of excuse itself.
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remains possible for the agent to act according to reasons other
than the desire to protect life and limb it might be argued that
she remains partially responsible for her failure to fulfill the
duty she owed the rightholder.28 Thus, the requirement to
apologize or voice regret would simultaneously accommodate
our evaluation of the agents will and the preeminence of the
victims rights.29 It is by no means clear, therefore, why it is
necessary to disregard excusing conditions when we are con-
sidering who should bear the burden resulting from a permis-
sible transgression.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM AVOIDABILITY
Thus far I have posited that all the central tenets of the received
view – causation as a necessary condition for bearing the bur-
den, the residual force of infringed rights and the irrelevance
of second-order morality – are consistent with non-liability.
A duty to apologize or express regret accommodates all three
conditions and provides a way of ensuring that the rights of the
victim are vindicated. Moreover, we have seen how a non-
pecuniary duty allows us differentiate the agent who trans-
gresses because of peril from the agent who transgresses
because they failed to exercise reasonable care. What this means
is that the answer to the question of what remedy the permis-
sible transgressor owes the rightholder does not provide us with
an answer to the question of who should bear the burden.
Nevertheless, defenders of the received view may insist that
compensation is the required remedy, say because the infringer
owns those losses that (foreseeably) result from the exercise of
her powers. With that in mind I now shift the focus of attention
to explicitly arguing against liability for permissible transgres-
28 On the idea that excusing conditions may not fully exonerate the
wrongdoer see J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, Proceedings of the Aristo-
telian Society 57 (1956–7): p. 3.
29 As we noted in Section I an apology or voicing of regret might also
provide a means of expressing agent-regret. That differs from the present
proposal because blaming treatment serves to express our assessment of the
agent, rather than a first-person assessment by the agent themselves. Nev-
ertheless, both these sources of reactive emotion provide support for the
idea that some form of remedial response would be fitting.
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sions. In this and the next section I present two arguments
against assigning the burden to the infringer that follow even if
we accept all three of the received views basic tenets.
According to first argument, individuals should only bear
those burdens for which they had the adequate opportunity to
avoid.30 The underlying idea here is that in determining who
should bear a burden (e.g. injury, obligations, punishment,
censure etc.) we should remain sensitive to the value we place
on being given a choice. That is to say, we have generic reasons
for wanting what happens to us depend on the way we choose
given the right conditions.31 Thus, an individual has legitimate
grounds for complaint if they end up with a burden that they
did not have the fair chance to avoid. This stands in contrast
with moral appraisal which does not require that the agent has
an alternative course of action available to them (e.g. we may
still blame the drug addict who wants her will to be determined
by a desire that it is not possible for her to resist).
In cases of peril the adequate opportunity to avoid the
burden is denied both because of the effect of peril on
the agents capacity to choose otherwise and because of the
impoverished choice set that confronts her. In other words,
second-order and first-order considerations play a role in
determining the extent to which a burden was avoidable. In
the first case, the agents opportunity to avoid the loss is
30 The argument I present here draws on the distinction that T.M.
Scanlon makes between attributive and substantive responsibility in his
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1998), chapter. 6 and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 198–206. See also
H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responses and Excuses, in Punishment and Responsi-
bility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp. 28–53 at pp. 44–48; Gary Watson, Two Faces
of Responsibility, in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 260–288 at p. 280. Here, however,
I apply the idea of a fair chance to avoid harm to the justification of
liability, rather than to the justification of blaming treatment.
31 On the value we attach to choice see Scanlon (1998, pp. 251–254) and
Scanlon, The Significance of Choice in S.M. McMurrin (ed.) The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, Vol. VIII (Salt Lake City: University of Utah,
1988), pp. 177–185.
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compromised by the fact that she is overwhelmed by the desire
to preserve herself or because her judgment is impaired by the
fact that she is consumed by fear. In the second case, the
imperiled agent is presented with two costly alternatives, one of
which is prohibitively costly. The fact that she lacks access to an
alternative that will not impose a significant cost on herself or
another, means that she is deprived of a fair chance to avoid
harm. The concern here is not the number of choices available
to the agent, but rather the absence of at least one (objectively)
decent alternative. This notion of inadequacy rests on the
absence of a satisfactory alternative, rather than on the fact
that the agent cannot be expected to resist avoiding the pro-
hibitive cost. We do not need to know how and why the
imperiled agent actually chose to act in order to conclude that
she should not bear the burden. The absence of a decent
alternative in her choice set suffices. Thus, we may conclude
that the burden is not adequately avoidable even if we disregard
the effect of peril on the agents will.
It might be argued that this cannot be right because it would
mean that an imperiled agent who is moved to transgress by
malign motives (e.g. revenge), rather than the desire to self-
preserve, both would have acted permissibly and would escape
liability. However, this example does not pose a challenge to
the view that I am defending. In the first place it may be argued
that while the agent who acts based on revenge is eligible for
moral criticism, it remains the case that she is not responsible
for the outcome in virtue of the fact that she lacked access to an
adequate alternative. In the second place, we may concede that
the vengeful agent is liable in virtue of her reasons for action.
But if that is the case then we must also concede that the
evaluation of the agents reasons for action is relevant to the
question of who should bear the burden. Thus, we end up back
with the proposal, examined in the previous section, that the
imperiled agent is non-liable in all but those rare cases when the
agent is unmoved by the desire to self-preserve.
A further upshot of this argument is that in cases of peril
neither the agent nor the victim was presented with an adequate
opportunity to avoid the harmful outcome and so neither
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should be left to bear the burden. In other words, it does not
entail that the loss must simply befall the victim. Nevertheless,
it remains the case that the agent used the victims rights
without his consent, and so an apology or expression of regret
is called for. Equally, from the perspective of the agent, that
requirement is justified because it remains the case that she had
the choice. However, the imposition of a further duty, such as a
duty to compensate, would be unjustified because she was not
presented with an adequate choice. This cannot be the whole
story though because while it explains what is required in order
to adequately vindicate the victims rights, it does not provide
us with a determinate answer to the question of who should
bear the burden. In Section VI I argue that the causality con-
dition that is presupposed by the received view provides us with
an explicit justification for spreading losses due to acts of
necessity between everyone. That is to say, I argue that the
entire burden should not be borne by the victim or the agent,
nor shared between them. Rather they should share the burden
along with all other members of the political community.
In response to the argument from avoidability advocates of
the received view may argue that the mere presence of an
alternative course of action is sufficient to accommodate the
value of choice. That is to say, liability does not hinge on the
adequacy of the choosing conditions that confront the agent.
Thus, the imperiled agent remains liable because she can as a
matter of fact choose otherwise. However, it is difficult to see
how the value of choice is satisfactorily accommodated if the
agent virtually cannot abstain from being moved by the desire
to self-preserve and where the only other alternative in her
choice set is almost certain death or serious injury. Neverthe-
less, I will shortly argue that once we take into account the
origin of the circumstance of necessity we have an argument for
non-liability that follows even if we accept that the quality of
the conditions for choice is irrelevant.
Finally, it might be argued that we should focus not on the
quality of choice that confronts the imperiled agent, but rather
her antecedent choices that causally contributed to the emer-
gence of the deadly predicament (e.g. her prior decision to go
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hiking). In the following section I turn to examine the issue of
the origin of necessity in detail. However, the argument from
avoidability already suggests that the emergency should only be
the imperiled agents problem if they were presented with a fair
opportunity to avoid exposure to it. It follows that, insofar as
the emergency was not reasonably foreseeable (e.g. freak
storm), the imperiled agent should not incur the burden
resulting from her response to it.
V. THE ARGUMENT FROM JOINT CAUSATION
In the preceding sections I have focused on the question of
whether the agents choice in response to the circumstance of
peril means that she is responsible for the harmful outcome.
But there is a prior issue that should be examined more care-
fully: namely, whether the circumstances of peril is the agents
problem in the first place. If the predicament is not the agents
problem then we may doubt that she should bear the burden
created by her life saving actions. I shall argue that the received
views commitment to the causality condition means that it
cannot avoid the conclusion that the emergency is everyones
problem.
The received view presupposes that the deadly predicament
befalls the endangered agent in all but those cases where it was
brought about by another individual (e.g. where the agent is
acting in self-defense in response to an act of aggression or
responding to a coercive threat). In those cases where the pre-
dicament is the result of another persons actions then liability
can be tracked back to them.32 Thus, it remains the case that
the predicament befalls the agent in those cases where they are
subject to an unforeseeable natural event such as a freak storm
or lightening strike. The predicament is simply their bad luck
rather than their responsibility, as would be the case if it were
foreseeable and avoidable. While the agent could not have
reasonably foreseen the predicament, it remains the case that
her prior choices led her to become exposed to the predicament
– for example, if the hiker had not decided to go hiking on that
32 See Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 114–115.
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particular day and in that particular area she would not have
been exposed to the freak storm. Thus, according to the
received view the fact that the imperiled agent is confronted by
a choice between a prohibitive cost and a less prohibitive cost is
her problem. The course of action she chooses to take in
response to the emergency merely serves to determine the type
of cost she will bear.
I contend that the received views claim that the problem
befalls the imperiled agent is ultimately dependent on an un-
argued assumption. Namely, that the causality condition ap-
plies to the destructive costs resulting from the agents response
to the circumstances of choice, but not to the emergence of the
circumstances of choice itself. Consider the case of the hiker
caught in a life threatening blizzard. But for the fact that the
meteorologist had forecasted fine weather, the local authorities
had decided to mark out a trail in that area, the fact that a
friend had recommended the trail to the hiker, the fact that a
traffic accident blocked the road in the direction of the area that
the hiker had originally planned to hike and so on, the cir-
cumstances of peril would not have occurred. The set of causes
is multiplied if we accept that acts of omission (e.g. the local
authoritys decision not to build an emergency shelter in the
hiking area) qualify as a cause.33 The predicament is the result
of innumerable antecedent decisions by agents other than just
the one who must respond to it. Note that the point that is
being made here is not the familiar one that causal indetermi-
nacy means that we cannot isolate the unique cause of the
harmful outcome.34 Rather it is that causal indeterminacy
means we cannot pinpoint the imperiled agent as the unique
33 See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causation and Rights: Some
Preliminaries, Chicago-Kent Law Review 63 (1987): 471–521 at pp. 494–495
and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causation: Omissions, Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 66(1) (2003): 81–103.
34 In the tort law literature the fact that every injury is jointly produced
has been used to show that causation is not sufficient for liability, See
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics
3(1) (1960): 1–44 and Guido Calabrasi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribu-
tion in Torts, Yale Law Journal 70 (1961): 499–553. The novelty of the line
of argument presented here is that it is focuses on the absence of a unique
cause of the deadly predicament, rather than the harmful outcome.
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cause of the circumstances of choice. In other words, the upshot
of the received views reliance on the causality condition is that
the deadly predicament is not simply a problem created by
those who are confronted by it. If that is correct we may ask
why the stricken agent should bear the burden created by her
response to that predicament.
One strategy that may be adopted by proponents of the
received view in response to this challenge is to show that causal
role of the imperiled agent in producing the circumstances of
peril is relevant, while the causal role of other agents in pro-
ducing those circumstances is not. As I noted in Section I the
received view can overcome the problem of indeterminacy with
regard to the harmful outcome by appealing to an objective
standard of foreseeability. I take it that the equivalent standard
is required in order to mitigate the problem of indeterminacy
with regard to the predicament. For without it the received view
has no way of picking out the unilateral cause of the emergency
from amongst the countless antecedent doings and non-doings.
In addition, the foreseeability standard is consistent with the
principle introduced in the previous section that individuals
should only be left to bear those burdens that they had the fair
chance to avoid.
However, even if we apply that criterion of avoidability to
the question of whose problem the emergency is, it would
remain the case that agents who are afflicted by a freak natural
event, such as the hiker or ship captain, are not responsible for
their predicament. Equally we cannot delegate responsibility to
anybody else unless it was reasonably foreseeable that their
actions would bring about the predicament (e.g. coercive threat
or act of aggression). Thus, from amongst those that unfore-
seeably contributed to the emergence of the deadly predica-
ment, none can be isolated as the unique cause.
The advocate of the received view might go on to argue that
the predicament befalls the imperiled agent because she inten-
tionally took take part in an activity (e.g. driving, hiking,
walking down the street etc.) where there was a risk of exposure
to an emergency. From amongst the countless individuals who
causally contributed to the emergence of the predicament, it
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was only the imperiled agent who was pursuing her aims by
partaking in the particular activity. The underlying idea here is
that particular risks are assigned to particular activities. Hence,
the risk that the hiker may become exposed to an unforeseeable
and deadly blizzard is assigned to the hiker and not to those
other activities, performed by others, that may have causally
contributed to the emergence of the predicament (e.g. weather
forecasting, trail building, road building etc.). That is to say, it
is not within the risk of those other activities. I take it that the
primary justification for the application of the risk rule is the
need to strike an appropriate balance between our interests in
avoiding injury and our interests in being free to pursue our
ends. Thus, an overemphasis on our security interests would
only serve to unreasonably circumscribe our liberty interests,
and vice versa.35 However, the idea of tracing responsibility for
the predicament back to the myriad actions that unforeseeably
contributed to its emergence does not entail that any particular
individual is saddled with an obligation not to act in the way
they did. Thus, it does not entail the limitation of any particular
individuals freedom of action. Rather there is only a duty
where it is possible for any individual to take reasonable pre-
cautions against foreseeably causing the emergence of circum-
stances of necessity. It is not clear, therefore, that the risk of
exposure to an unforeseeable predicament should be assigned
to the participant in any particular activity.
It take it that, therefore, the only remaining response avail-
able to the defender of the received view is to argue that that it
is purely bad luck and not agent causation that determines
whose problem the predicament is. That is, if all those who
were causally implicated exercised sufficient care then the mis-
fortune simply lies where it falls. But if so they would need to
explain why the causality condition is relevant to the question
of who should bear the burden and yet irrelevant to question of
whose problem the predicament is. Even though the received
view is ultimately reliant on the claim that agent causation
applies to burdens but not predicaments, it does not provide us
with principled account of why we should make such a
35 See, for example, Ripstein, 1999, pp. 50–52, 71–72.
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distinction. As a result, it does not establish that the (unfore-
seeable) emergency is the imperiled agents problem and,
therefore, that she should bear the cost of her response to that
predicament.
VI. HOLDING LOSSES IN COMMON
It may be argued that if the predicament does not befall the
imperiled agent then we end up disregarding the security
interests of the victim of the agents life-saving actions. If by
security interests we mean the victims interest in not having
what happens to him depend on the choices of others then we
already have a remedial measure in place. For the agent owes
the victim a formal apology for denying the victims right of
control over how his right is used. Thus, it is only with respect
to the denial of the means that the victim would have had to
pursue his personal ends that we run the risk of disregarding his
security interests. Indeed, the implication of the arguments
from avoidability and joint causation is that the entire loss
should not befall the victim, let alone the agent. Thus, we still
have not arrived at an determinate answer to the question of
who should bear the burden. However, the lack of a defensible
alternative already suggests that losses due to permissible
transgressions should be borne by everyone.
However, we need not arrive at the conclusion merely by
default. For the argument from joint causation does provide us
with a rationale for the holding such losses in common. The
upshot of that argument was not so much that the (unfore-
seeable) predicament does not belong to the imperiled agent,
but rather that it belongs to everyone. If that is the case, then it
is hard to see why the imperiled agent alone should be made
responsible for the cost of her response to that predicament.
Rather, the joint (and unforeseeable) causation of the circum-
stances of peril suggests that losses that arise because of a
permissible response to those circumstances should be spread
amongst members of a mandatory social insurance pool.
Defenders of the received view typically argue against loss
spreading on the grounds that an individuals membership of
the insurance pool is not determined by their causal role in
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producing a misfortune.36 Some rationales for loss spreading
do abandon the causal link between the action and the effect.
For example, mandatory insurance may be advocated on the
grounds that it helps to factor out luck in the way things turn
out – the underlying concern here is that of two agents who
behave in a similar way in similar circumstances, the inter-
vention of luck between the action and outcome may mean that
only one may cause a loss, or there may be a significant dif-
ference in the extent of the loss each causes.37 Alternatively,
insurance may be imposed so as to encourage cooperation that
is mutually advantageous – potential risk creators are encour-
aged to participate because they will avoid the possibility of
being burdened with a massive loss and potential victims of risk
are encouraged to participate because compensation is certain.
In both these cases an individuals membership of the insurance
pool is determined by the fact that they are engaging in an
activity that creates the risk of a misfortune (e.g. risk of being
exposed to a deadly blizzard). Hence, their contribution to the
compensation of a loss is not determined by whether they in
fact played a role in causing that loss (e.g. breaking into an
unoccupied log cabin).
Those arguments may be used in support of loss spreading in
cases of peril. However, they do not, in themselves, rule out
dispersing losses in those cases where the predicament was
foreseeably created (e.g. going hiking when inclement weather
was forecasted) and in those cases where the imperiled agents
reaction is impermissible (e.g. hiker damages more of the cabin
than is necessary in order to escape peril). By contrast the
argument I am presenting only advocates holding in common
those losses that were caused by a permissible response to an
unforeseeable emergency. Moreover, that argument does not
discount the causal connection between the agent and the
outcome. Rather it contends that responsibility cannot be
36 See for example, Weinrib, 1995, pp. 36–38.
37 See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and
Massive Loss, in David G. Owens (ed.) Philosophical Foundations of Tort
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 387–408 and Christopher H
Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, UCLA
Law Review 38 (1990): 143–162.
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pinned to any particular agent because the deadly predicament
was jointly caused by innumerable agents. In other words, in
keeping with the causality condition, membership of the
insurance pool is determined by (unforeseeable) causation, ra-
ther than risk imposition.
Note, however, that holding such losses in common does not
amount to saying that privately owned resources revert to being
owned in common during times of emergency (e.g. a privately
owned cabin becomes a public financed emergency shelter
insofar as it required by someone in distress). That much is
clear from the fact that if imperilment converts a life saving
resource into a public commodity, then no compensation would
be owed to the private rightholder. Moreover, I have argued
that the imperiled agent has a duty to apologize in virtue of the
fact that she infringed the victims right.
It may be argued that, if joint causation of the predicament
rules out holding the imperiled agent liable, then it should also
rule out a saddling her with a remedial obligation of any kind.
However, I take it that that challenge does not amount to
saying that the victims right does not persist in virtue of joint
causation. That is, in keeping with the received view, it accepts
that the stricken agent failed to fulfill a duty that she owed the
rightholder. But it does not seem tenable to hold both that an
agent breached a duty that she owed the victim and that she
owes no remedial duty to the victim in virtue of that breach. In
some cases the transgressor may be permitted not to perform
their remedial duty (e.g. it may conflict with an overriding
duty), but that does entail that the agent ceases to have such a
duty. Even if it is argued that the logic of rights does not
commit us to the conclusion that a remedial duty is necessarily
entailed by the transgression of a claim-right, it remains the
case that there ought to be some means of vindicating the
victims rights. That is, a way of recognizing that the victim
does have a right and that that right was transgressed by the
agent.
I have argued that losses due to permissible transgressions
should be held in common both because of the absence of a
satisfactory alternative and because the emergency is a joint
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product. For reasons of space I shall not flesh out that line of
argument in more detail. Note, however, the plausibility of the
argument for loss spreading does not affect the plausibility of
the negative conclusion, developed in the preceding sections,
that liability does not follow from the core premises that
undergird the received view.
VII. PERMISSIBLE INTERVENTIONS
The focus of the discussion thus far has been permissible acts of
self-rescue. Before concluding it is worth considering whether
we can extend the joint causation argument to those cases in
which an individual permissibly transgresses on behalf of
another (e.g. rescuing an imperiled hiker by breaking into a
cabin or destroying an individuals house so as to prevent the
spread of a deadly forest fire).
According to the received view bystander B is liable if she
permissibly transgresses Vs rights in order to effect the rescue
of A. I take it that that the received views argument for that
conclusion rests on the assumption that there is a stronger
normative constraint against causing harm, than there is
against allowing harm. In other words, while B ought to effect
As rescue, she is not duty bound to do so.38 As a matter of
second-order morality B is eligible for moral criticism if she
fails to carry out a rescue. However, as a matter of first-order
morality her failure to do so is not impermissible (i.e. not a
breach of a duty she owes imperiled agent). That is, the reasons
why B ought to rescue A, and therefore why a transgression of
Vs right would be permissible, are not sufficient to establish
that she has a duty to rescue A. What this means is that the
deadly predicament that befalls A does not trigger a strict
requirement that B perform the rescue (although it should be
noted that B would have a Good Samaritan duty in those cases
38 On the absence of a duty to rescue see, for example, Thomson, 1986,
pp. 61ff and 1990, pp. 160–163. According to the received view the right-
holder has a duty not to prevent a permissible self-rescue and the state may
use coercion to enforce that duty. However, the impermissibility of pre-
venting self-rescue does not entail that the rightholder himself has a duty to
rescue. See Thomson, 1991, pp. 113–115, 117 and McCarthy, 2000, p. 772.
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where she foreseeably caused the predicament). From that it
follows that the cost caused by Bs permissible intervention
cannot be traced back to A.
One problem with this account of permissible interventions
is that it generates a counter-intuitive conclusion in those cases
where the individual who is rescued is also the rightholder. By
way of illustration consider the following variation on the hiker
example: During a blizzard B stumbles across A who has been
rendered unconscious as a result of hyperthermia. B rescues A
by breaking into a nearby cabin. Unbeknownst to B the cabin
belongs to A. The upshot of the received view is that B has a
duty to compensate A for the damage she caused to the cabin.
Even the imposition of a duty to apologize seems entirely
unjustified in such cases. One of the advantages to be gained
from extending the argument from joint causation to cases of
rescue is that it avoids that counter-intuitive outcome.
In keeping with the received view let us assume that B does
not have a duty to rescue A. To that add the further claims,
defended here, that unforeseeable emergencies are everyones
problem and that losses due to permissible responses to such
emergencies should be held in common. It follows that if B
decides to intervene, then the resulting burden to V or B is
borne by everyone. The same conclusion follows in those cases
where the intervening agent permissibly kills some in order to
save many – for example, a bystander switches the tracks such
that a runaway trolley is diverted away from the path of five
railway workers and into the path of one railway worker.39
We have seen how losses should be held in common in those
cases where an agent permissibly transgresses in response to
perilous circumstances and how that conclusion holds even
when the transgressor is not the one who is confronted by peril.
However, it is not the case that all infringements entail the
dispersal of losses. Consider those cases where the creation of
the emergency was reasonably foreseeable: for example, the
39 It is noteworthy that Judith Thomson does not follow in strict accor-
dance with the received view in those cases where an agent permissibly
intervenes. In cases such as trolley she is ambivalent about whether the agent
is liable and in cases of rescue she suggests that the rightholder and rescuer
should share the burden. Thomson, 1990, p. 100 and 1986, p. 41.
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hiker who was aware that a snow storm was expected, the
individual who deliberately sets the trolley in motion in order to
kill the five, the robber who threatens to kill the bank teller if
she does not hand over the money, the individual who is injured
when the target of his aggression responds in self-defense, and
so on. In such cases the agents transgression remains permis-
sible, but the burden is borne by the individual who foreseeably
created the predicament.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The received view contends that those individuals who per-
missibly transgress in response to an emergency must bear any
losses that are (foreseeably) caused as a result. The existing
responses to that line of argument in the literature have been
primarily concerned with challenging one or more of its basic
premises – namely, moral residualism, agent causation and
first-order morality. Advocates of the erasure view, for exam-
ple, argue that permissibility extinguishes the moral force of
rights and, therefore, that shifting the burden to the agent
cannot be justified on the grounds that she transgressed a right.
Others may reject the causality condition because it is insensi-
tive to luck in the way things turn out. Still others may argue
that the inclusion of second-order considerations is not
incompatible with the demand that we take adequate account
of the victims rights. Here, however, I have argued that the
permissible transgressor is not liable even if we accept the basic
premises that underpin the received view. In the first place those
premises are sufficiently accommodated by a non-pecuniary
duty such as a formal apology or expression of regret. In the
second place, I have argued that agents should not bear the
burden created by their responses to an unforeseeable emer-
gency because that outcome was not adequately avoidable and
because of the joint causation of the predicament. A significant
implication of this line of argument is that the answer to the
question of what remedy the permissible transgressor owes the
rightholder does not provide us with an answer to the question
of who should bear the burden. This, I readily concede, rep-
resents a departure from the idea central to tort law that the
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agent must absorb those losses that are (foreseeably) caused by
her wrongdoing. If the arguments presented here stand up to
scrutiny, then I contend there is good reason to treat permis-
sible responses to emergencies as an exception to that rule.
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